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Summary 
Happiness is defined as the degree to which a person enjoys his or her 
life-as-a-whole. Accordingly ‘Gross National Happiness’ is defined as the 
degree to which citizens in a country enjoy the life they live. Individual 
happiness can be measured by self-report on a single standard question. 
Hence Gross National Happiness can be measured by the average response 
to such questions in general populations surveys.  
Survey data on average self-report of happiness can be combined with 
estimates of life expectancy based on civil registration. The resulting index 
denotes how long and happy people live in a country and can be expressed 
in a number of Happy-Life-Years (HLY).  
Comparison across present day nations shows huge differences on this 
indicator, HLY varying between 63 (Switzerland) and 21 (Moldavia). About 
80% of these differences can be explained by variation in societal 
characteristics, such as economic development, political democracy and 
mutual trust. HLY varies also over time. During the last decade it rose in 
western nations but plunged in the former Soviet nations.  
It is argued that HLY is the best available indicator of Gross National 
Happiness.  
Introduction 
The concept of 'Gross National Happiness' (GNH) was introduced in 
the political discourse in the 1960s by the late king of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji 
Wangchuck. In 1971 the idea was articulated by the present King Jigme 
Singye Wangchuck is his famous statement that "Gross National Happiness 
is more important than Gross National Product" (Priesner 1999: 28). In 1991 
the idea was mentioned in the Five Year Plan (7th 5-year plan pp. 22) and in 
1998 the Prime Minister elaborated the idea in an international address 
(Thinley 1998).  
These statements did not aim at scientific precision in the first place, 
but served to indicate a political direction. The motto worked well to that 
end and appeals also outside Bhutan. This success now calls for 
measurement of the matter. Once we accept the idea that the country should 
aim at Gross National Happiness we need tools to assess how successful the 
country is in realizing that end.  
Measuring Gross National Happiness requires first of all that we define 
what happiness is. To that end I start in the following with a review the 
various meanings of the word and select the meaning that fits best with 
official statements on the matter. That is the meaning of 'life-satisfaction'. In 
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the next section, I will consider the available measures of life-satisfaction in 
nations and conclude that this can best be measured using self-reports. This 
followed by a section where I argue that survey data on subjective life-
satisfaction can be combined with data on life-expectancy and that the 
resulting estimate of 'happy life years' indicates how long and happy people 
live in a country. In the final section, I review the available data on that 
matter and consider the merits of that measure on that empirical basis.  
Concept of Happiness 
The word happiness is often used interchangeably with the term 
'quality of life'. When used in that sense it is an umbrella term for different 
notions of the good life. These notions can be ordered on the basis of the 
following two distinctions:   
Chances and Outcomes 
A first distinction is between opportunities for a good life and the good 
life itself. This is the difference between potentiality and actuality. I refer to 
this as 'life-chances'1 and 'life-results'. Opportunities and outcomes are 
related, but are certainly not the same. Chances can fail to be realized, due 
to stupidity or bad luck. Conversely, people sometimes make much of their 
life in spite of poor opportunities.  
This distinction is quite common in the field of public-health research. 
Pre-conditions for good health, such as adequate nutrition and professional 
care are seldom mixed up with health itself. Yet, in social policy discussions 
means and ends are less well distinguished.  
Outer and Inner Qualities  
A second difference is between 'external' and 'inner' qualities. In the 
first case the quality is in the environment, in the latter it is in the 
individual. Lane (1994) made this distinction clear by telling 'quality of 
society’ from 'quality of persons'.  
This distinction is also quite common in public health. External 
pathogens are distinguished from inner afflictions. Yet again, this basic 
insight is lacking in many social policy discussions.  
Four Qualities of Life 
The combination of these two dichotomies yields a fourfold matrix. 
This classification is presented in scheme 1. The distinction between chances 
and results is presented vertically, the difference between outer and inner 
qualities horizontally.  
                                                          
1 In sociology, the term 'life-chances' is used in the more limited meaning of access to scarce resources in 
society.  
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In the upper half of the scheme, we see two variants of potential 
quality of life, with next to the outer opportunities in one's environment, the 
inner capacities to exploit these. The environmental chances can be denoted 
by the term livability, the personal capacities with the word life-ability. This 
difference is not new. In sociology, the distinction between 'social capital' 
and 'psychological capital' is sometimes used in this context. In the 
psychology of stress, the difference is labeled negatively in terms of 'burden' 
and 'bearing power'.  
The lower half of the scheme is about the quality of life with respect to 
its outcomes. These outcomes can be judged by their value for one's 
environment and by value for oneself. The external worth of a life is 
denoted by the term utility of life. The inner valuation of it is called 
appreciation of life. These matters are of course related. Knowing that one’s 
life is useful will typically add to the appreciation of it. Yet useful-lives are 
not always happy lives and not every good-for-nothing really cares. This 
difference has been elaborated in discussions on utilitarian moral 
philosophy, which praises happiness as the highest good. Adversaries of 
that view hold that there is more worth to life than just pleasures and pains. 
Mill (1861) summarized that position in his famous statement that he 
preferred an unhappy Socrates to a happy fool.  
 
Scheme 1: Four qualities of life 
 Outer 
qualities 
Inner qualities 
Life 
chances 
Livability of 
environment 
Life-ability of the person 
Life 
results 
Utility of life Enjoyment of life  
 
Livability of the Environment  
The left top quadrant denotes the meaning of good living conditions. 
Formerly, the term 'happiness' was often used for this particular meaning, 
especially in social philosophy. Currently, this matter is mostly called 
'quality-of-life' or 'wellbeing'. Other terms are 'welfare' and 'level of living' 
'Livability' is a better word, because it refers explicitly to a 
characteristic of the environment and does not have the limited connotation 
of material conditions. One could also speak of the 'habitability' of an 
environment, though that term is also used for the quality of housing in 
particular. Elsewhere I have explored that concept of livability in more 
detail (Veenhoven 1996:7-9).  
Ecologists see livability in the natural environment and describe it in 
terms of pollution, global warming and degradation of nature. Currently, 
they associate livability typically with environmental preservation. City 
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planners see livability in the built environment and associate it with sewer 
systems, traffic jams and ghetto formation. Here the good life is seen as a 
fruit of human intervention. In public health this all is referred to as a 'sane' 
environment.  
In the sociological view, society is central. Firstly, livability is 
associated with the quality of society as a whole. Classic concepts of the 
‘good society’ stress material welfare and social equality, sometimes 
equating the concept more or less with the welfare state. Current 
communitaristic notions emphasize close networks, strong norms and active 
voluntary associations. The reverse of that livability concept is ‘social 
fragmentation’. Secondly, livability is seen in one’s position in society. For 
long, the emphasis was on ‘under-class’ but currently attention shifts to 
‘outer-class’. The corresponding antonyms are ‘deprivation’ and ‘exclusion’.  
Life-ability of the Person  
The right top quadrant denotes inner life-chances. That is: how well we 
are equipped to cope with the problems of life. This aspect of the good life is 
also known by different names. Doctors and psychologists use the terms 
'quality of life' and 'well-being' to denote this specific meaning. There are 
more names however. In biology, this meaning is referred to as 'fitness'. On 
other occasions, it is denoted by the medical term 'health', in the medium 
variant of the word2, or by psychological terms such as 'efficacy' or 
'potency'. Sen (1993) calls this quality of life variant 'capability'. I prefer the 
simple term 'life-ability', which contrasts elegantly with 'livability'.  
The most common depiction of this quality of life is absence of 
functional defects. This is 'health' in the limited sense, sometimes referred to 
as 'negative health'. In this context, doctors focus on unimpaired functioning 
of the body, while psychologists stress the absence of mental defects. This 
use of words presupposes a 'normal' level of functioning. Good quality of 
life is the body and mind working as designed. This is the common meaning 
used in curative care.  
Next to absence of disease, one can consider excellence of function. 
This is referred to as 'positive health' and associated with energy and 
resilience. Psychological concepts of positive mental health involve also 
autonomy, reality control, creativity and inner synergy of traits and 
strivings. A new term in this context is 'emotional intelligence'. Though 
originally meant for specific mental skills, this term has come to denote a 
broad range of mental capabilities. This broader definition is the favorite in 
training professions.  
A further step is to evaluate capability in a developmental perspective 
and to include acquisition of new skills for living. This is commonly 
denoted by the term 'self-actualization'; from this point of view a middle-
                                                          
2 A problem with this name is that the utilitarians used the word utility for subjective appreciation of life, 
the sum of pleasures and pains.  
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aged man is not 'well' if he behaves like an adolescent, even if he functions 
without problems at this level. Since abilities do not develop in idleness, this 
quality of life is close to the ‘activity’ in Aristotle’s concept of eudaimonia 
(Ostenfelt, 1994). This quality concept is also currently used in the training 
professions.  
Lastly, the term 'art of living' denotes special life-abilities; in most 
contexts this quality is distinguished from mental health and sometimes 
even attributed to slightly disturbed persons. Art of living is associated with 
refined tastes, an ability to enjoy life and an original style of life (Veenhoven 
2003).  
Utility of Life  
The left bottom quadrant represents the notion that a good life must be 
good for something more than itself. This presumes some higher values. 
There is no current generic for these external turnouts of life. Gerson (1976: 
795) referred to these kinds as 'transcendental' conceptions of quality of life. 
Another appellation is 'meaning of life', which then denotes 'true' 
significance instead of mere subjective sense of meaning. I prefer the more 
simple 'utility of life', admitting that this label may also give rise to 
misunderstanding3. Be aware that this external utility does not require inner 
awareness. A person's life may be useful from some viewpoints, without 
them knowing4.  
When evaluating the external effects of a life, one can consider its 
functionality for the environment. In this context, doctors stress how 
essential a patient's life is to its intimates. The life of a mother with young 
children is valued as higher than the life of a woman of the same age 
without children. Likewise, indispensability at the workplace figures in 
medical quality of life notions.  
At a higher level, quality of life is seen in contributions to society. 
Historians see quality in the addition an individual can make to human 
culture, and rate for example the lives of great inventors higher than those 
of anonymous peasants do. Moralists see quality in the preservation of the 
moral order, and would deem the life of a saint to be better than that of a 
sinner.  
In this vein, the quality of a life is also linked to effects on the 
ecosystem. Ecologists see more quality in a life lived in a 'sustainable' 
manner than in the life of a polluter. In a broader view, the utility of life can 
be seen in its consequences for long-term evolution. As an individual's life 
can have many environmental effects, the number of such utilities is almost 
infinite.  
                                                          
3 A problem with this name is that the utilitarians used the word utility for subjective appreciation of life, 
the sum of pleasures and pains.  
4 Frank’s (1946) logo-therapy aims to make people believe in meanings of their life they do not see.  
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Apart from its functional utility, life is also judged on its moral or 
esthetic value. Returning to Mill's statement that he preferred an unhappy 
Socrates to a happy fool, Mill did not say this just because Socrates was a 
philosopher whose words have come down to us; it was also because he 
admired Socrates as an outstanding human being. Likewise, most of us 
would attribute more quality to the life of Florence Nightingale than to that 
of a drunk, even if it appeared that her good works had a negative result in 
the end. In classic moral philosophy this is called 'virtuous living', and is 
often presented as the essence of 'true happiness'.  
Enjoyment of Life  
Finally, the bottom right quadrant represents the inner outcomes of 
life. That is the quality in the eye of the beholder. As we deal with conscious 
humans, this quality boils down to subjective appreciation of life. This is 
commonly referred to by terms such as 'subjective wellbeing', 'life-
satisfaction' and 'happiness' in a limited sense of the word.  
Humans are capable of evaluating their life in different ways. We have 
in common with all higher animals that we can appraise our situation 
affectively. We feel good or bad about particular things and our mood level 
signals overall adaptation. As in animals these affective appraisals are 
automatic, but unlike other animals it is known that humans can reflect on 
that experience. We have an idea of how we have felt over the last year, 
while a cat does not. Humans can also judge life cognitively by comparing 
life as it is with notions of how it should be.  
Most human evaluations are based on both sources of information, that 
is: intuitive affective appraisal and cognitively guided evaluation. The mix 
depends mainly on the object. Tangible things such as our income are 
typically evaluated by comparison; intangible matters such as sexual 
attractiveness are evaluated by how it feels. This dual evaluation system 
probably makes the human experiential repertoire richer than that of our 
fellow-creatures.  
In evaluating our life, we typically summarize this rich experience in 
overall appraisals. For instance, we appreciate domains of life. When asked 
how we feel about our work or own marriage, we will mostly have an 
opinion. Likewise, most people form ideas about separate qualities of their 
life, for instance how challenging their life is and whether there is any 
meaning in it. Such judgments are made in different time-perspectives, in 
the past, the present and in the future. As the future is less palpable than the 
past and the present, hopes and fears depend more on affective inclination 
than on cognitive calculation. Next to aspects of life, we also judge life-as-a-
whole.  
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Happiness and other Enjoyments 
Even when we focus on subjective enjoyment of life, there are still 
different meanings associated with the word happiness. These meanings 
can also be charted in a fourfold classification. In this case, that classification 
is based on the following dichotomies: 
Life-aspects versus Life-as-a-whole 
Above, we have seen that appraisals of life can concern aspects, such as 
marriage or work-life, and one's life-as-a-whole. The word 'happiness' is 
used in both contexts. Obviously, such appraisals are linked. Enjoyment of 
aspects of life will typically contribute to the satisfaction with life as a whole 
(so-called bottom-up effect), and enjoyment of one's life-as-a-whole appears 
to foster the satisfaction with life-aspects (top-down). Still, these are not 
identical matters. One can have a happy marriage but still be dissatisfied 
with life-as-a-whole, or be satisfied with life-as-a-whole in spite of an 
unhappy marriage.  
Passing Delight versus Enduring Satisfaction 
The experience of enjoyment can be short-lived or enduring. Again, the 
word happiness is used for both phenomena. Sometimes it refers to passing 
moods and at other occasions for stable satisfaction. Once more, these 
matters are related but not the same.  
When combined, these distinctions produce the fourfold classification 
presented in scheme 2. The difference between part and whole is presented 
vertically, and the distinction between passing and enduring enjoyment 
horizontally.  
 
Scheme 2: Four kinds of satisfaction 
  Passing Enduring 
Life aspects 
 
Instant 
satisfactions 
(instant utility) 
Domain-satisfactions 
 
Life as a whole Top experience Life-satisfaction 
(Happiness) 
 
 
Pleasure 
The top-left quadrant represents passing enjoyments of life-aspects. 
Examples are the delight of a cup of tea at breakfast, the satisfaction with a 
chore done or the enjoyment of a piece of art. Nobel laureate Kanahan 
(1999) calls this 'instant-utilities'. Frequent experience of such passing 
pleasures is probably a necessary condition for enduring satisfaction with 
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life-as-a-whole, but probably not a sufficient one since life-satisfaction 
requires also a sense of meaning.  
The term happiness is used in the sense of pleasure, especially by 
critics of utilitarianism5 who thus denounce that moral philosophy as 
superficial hedonism.  
Domain Satisfaction 
The top right quadrant denotes enduring appreciation of life-aspects, 
such as marriage satisfaction and job-satisfaction. This is currently referred 
to as domain-satisfactions. Though domain-satisfactions depend typically on a 
constant flow of instant-satisfactions, they have some continuity of their 
own. For instance, one can remain satisfied with one's marriage even if one 
has not enjoyed the company of the spouse for quite some time.  
The term happiness is sometimes used in this sense, in particular to 
denote satisfaction with one's career. That use of the word is mostly also 
polemic and serves to denote that such rat-race happiness is not very 
worthwhile.  
Satisfaction with major domains of life obviously ads to satisfaction 
with ones life-as-a-whole. Yet these things are not the same. One can be 
satisfied with one's work and marriage, but still be dissatisfied with one's 
life-as-a-whole because one has failed a cause.  
Top-experience 
The bottom right quadrant denotes the combination of passing 
experience and appraisal of life-as-a-whole. That combination occurs 
typically in so-called 'top-experiences', which involve short-lived but quite 
intense oceanic feelings. Mystics and poets use the term happiness often in 
this sense. Yet this meaning should not be equated with enduring 
enjoyment of life-as-a-whole; these phenomena are in fact antithetical, 
people who go through top-experiences most often are typically not the 
most satisfied with life.  
Life-satisfaction 
Lastly, the bottom-right quadrant represents the combination of 
enduring satisfaction with life-as-a-whole. This is happiness in the sense of 
life-satisfaction. This meaning is clearly the most relevant for policy makers 
and comes closest to the notion of Gross National Happiness.  
                                                          
5 Utilitarian moral philosophy holds that the good and bad of all actions should be judged by its effects on 
human happiness, the morally best action being the one that provides the 'greatest happiness for the 
greatest number'. Jeremy Bentham (1798) is a spokesman of this view. When applied on public choice, 
this theory is known as 'rule-utilitarianism'.  
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Likeness with the Bhutanese Notion of 'Gross National 
Happiness' 
Close reading of statements of the Bhutanese government on 'Gross 
national Happiness' learns that happiness is seen as a state of an individual 
and not as a state of society. The goal is to promote the happiness of citizens, 
and the development of society is one of the means (Thingley 1998: 14-15). 
Happiness as such is distinguished from its presumed determinants, such as 
'material wealth', 'Enlightenment education', 'natural environment' and 
'good governance' (Thingley 1998 15-22). This means that the concept 
belongs in the right half of scheme 1; in the column of 'inner' qualities of life.  
The first official document speaks about the 'emotional wellbeing of the 
population' (7th 5-year plan pp. 22) and in later statements the term is used 
interchangeably with 'good mood' and 'contentment'. This means that the 
concept addresses experienced outcomes of life and fits the right-bottom 
quadrant in scheme 1, which denotes 'satisfaction'.  
The texts make also clear that happiness is seen as a lasting state of 
mind, and not as a passing mood. The aim is obviously not at creating short-
lived thrills. So the concept must be placed in the right half of scheme 2 that 
denotes 'enduring satisfaction'. Likewise, the texts leave no doubt that 
happiness is seen as an appraisal of life-as-a-whole rather than as 
satisfaction with a particular domain of life. So the Bhutanese notion of 
happiness fits the right-bottom quadrant of scheme 2; that is life-satisfaction.  
Definition of Individual Happiness 
In this line, happiness can be defined as the degree to which a person 
evaluates the overall quality of his present life-as-a-whole positively. In 
other words, how much the person likes the life he/she leads.  
Scope of Evaluation  
The concept of happiness denotes an overall evaluation of life. 
Therefore, the appraisal that life is `exciting' does not mark it as `happy'. 
There may be too much excitement in life, and too little of other qualities. 
The overall evaluation of life involves all the criteria figuring in the mind of 
the individual: how good it feels, how well it meets expectations, how 
desirable it is deemed to be, etc.  
Kind of Evaluation 
When we appraise how much we appreciate the life we live, we seem 
to use two sources of information: Affectively, we estimate how well we feel 
generally, and at the cognitive level we compare 'life as it is' with standards 
of 'how life should be'. The former affective source of information seems 
generally to be more important than the latter cognitive one (Veenhoven 
1996a: 33-35). The word happiness is commonly used for these 'subtotals' as 
well as for the comprehensive appraisal. I use the terms 'overall happiness' or 
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'life satisfaction' for the comprehensive judgment and refer to the affective 
and cognitive sub-appraisals as respectively 'hedonic level of affect' and 
'contentment'. These concepts are delineated in more detail in Veenhoven 
(1984: chapter 2).  
Temporal Range  
Appraisals of life can concern different periods in time: how life has 
been, how it is now, and how it will probably be in the future. These 
evaluations do not coincide necessarily; one may be positive about past life, 
but negative about the future. The focus of this paper is on satisfaction with 
present life.  
I am not sure that this definition fully fits with the notion that authors 
of Bhutanese government texts had in mind. Possibly some of them aimed 
at a specific Buddhist variant and thought of serene contentment in the first 
place. If so, I would still prefer the above definition, since it has several 
advantages. One advantage is that this concept of happiness is broad 
enough to encompass such local variations. Another plus is that this concept 
has proven to be well measurable and comparable across cultures.  
Definition of Gross National Happiness 
Following the above definition of individual happiness, Gross National 
Happiness can be defined as the degree to which citizens in a country enjoy 
the life they live. Gross National Happiness is then an aggregate concept, 
like the concept of Gross National Product that sums goods and services. If 
every citizen counts equally much in this sum, the concept can be quantified 
using the average of individual happiness in the country.  
Measurement of of Happiness 
In Bhutanese statements about GNH it is commonly assumed that 
happiness cannot be quantified and compared across time and nations like 
GNP. Yet the kind of happiness defined above can be measured using 
surveys in which a representative sample of citizens is asked how much 
they enjoy their life-as-a-whole. Since the 1960s this is common practice and 
this research has yielded much information about the usefulness of this 
method.  
Measurement has long been understood as `objective' and `external' 
assessment, analogous to the measurement of blood pressure by a doctor. 
By now, we know that happiness cannot be measured that way. Steady 
physiological correlates have not been discovered, and probably never will 
be. Nor have any overt behaviors been found to be consistently linked to 
inner enjoyment of life. Like most attitudinal phenomena, happiness is only 
partially reflected in behavior. Though some social behaviors tend to be 
more frequent among the happy (active, outgoing, friendly), such conduct is 
also observed among unhappy persons. Likewise, non-verbal behaviors 
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such as frequent smiling or enthusiastic movements appear to be only 
modestly related to self-reports of happiness. Consequently, estimates of 
someone's happiness by his peers are often wrong. Suicidal behavior is 
probably more indicative of happiness. Almost all people who attempt or 
commit suicide are quite unhappy. However, not all the unhappy seek 
resort to suicide. In fact, only a fraction does.  
Survey Questions on Happiness 
Inference from overt behavior being impossible, we must make do with 
questioning. That is, simply asking people how much they enjoy their life-
as-a-whole. Such questions can be posed in various contexts; clinical 
interviews, life-review questionnaires and common survey interviews. The 
questions can be posed in different ways; directly or indirectly, and by 
means of single or multiple items. A common survey question is: 
Taking all together, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you currently with 
your life as a whole? 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    10 
 
Dissatisfied            Satisfied 
 
Since the 1970's, such questions have been included in many 'Quality-
of-Life' surveys all over the world. There is now a growing body of data on 
happiness in nations. Presently there are comparable surveys in 67 nations. 
The data are brought together in the 'World Database of Happiness' (WDH 
2003).  
Doubts about Happiness Self-reports 
Yet there are many qualms about such simple self-reports of happiness. 
Elsewhere I have considered the objections and inspected the empirical 
evidence for claims about bias. I will summarize the main points below. For 
more detail and references, see Veenhoven 1984 chapter 3 and Veenhoven 
1993, chapter 5.  
Validity  
Critics have suggested that responses to questions on life-satisfaction 
actually measure other phenomena. Rather than indicating how much the 
respondent enjoys life, answers would reflect his normative notions and 
desires.  
 298   Happy Life Years: A Measure of Gross National Happiness  
 
 
No Notion 
One of the misgivings is that most people have no opinion at all about 
their happiness. They would be more aware of how happy they are 
supposed to be, and report that instead. Though this may happen 
incidentally, it does not appear to be the rule. Most people know quite well 
whether they enjoy life. Eight out of ten Americans think of it every week. 
Responses on questions about happiness tend to be prompt. Non-response 
on these items is low; both absolutely (± 1%) and relatively to other 
attitudinal questions. `Don't know' responses are infrequent as well.  
A related assertion is that respondents mix up how happy they actually 
are, with how happy other people think they are, given their situation. If so, 
people considered being well off would typically report to be very happy, 
and people regarded as disadvantaged should characterize themselves as 
unhappy. That pattern is observed sometimes, but it is not general. For 
instance, in The Netherlands, good education is seen as a pre-requisite for a 
good life, but the highly educated appear slightly less happy in comparison 
to their less educated counterparts.  
Colored Answers 
Another objection concerns the presence of systematic bias in 
responses. It is assumed that questions on happiness are interpreted 
correctly, but that responses are often false. People who are actually 
dissatisfied with their life would tend to answer that they are quite happy. 
Both ego-defense and social-desirability would cause such distortions.  
This bias is seen to manifest itself in over-report of happiness; most 
people claim to be happy, and most perceive themselves as happier than 
average. Another indication of bias is seen in the finding that psychosomatic 
complaints are not uncommon among the happy. However, these findings 
allow other interpretations as well. Firstly, the fact that more people say to 
be happy than unhappy does not imply over-report of happiness. It is quite 
possible that most people are truly happy (some reasons will be discussed 
below). Secondly, there are also good reasons why most people think that 
they are more happy than average. One such reason is that most people are 
like critical scientists and think that unhappiness is the rule. Thirdly, the 
occurrence of headaches and worries among the happy does not prove 
response distortion. Life can be a sore trial some times, but still be satisfying 
on a balance.  
The proof of the pudding is in demonstrating the response distortion 
itself. Some clinical studies have tried to do so by comparing responses to 
single direct questions with ratings based on depth interviews and 
projective tests. The results are generally not different from responses to 
single direct questions posed by an anonymous interviewer.  
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Reliability  
Though single questions on happiness seem to measure what they are 
supposed to measure, they measure it rather imprecisely.  
When the same question is asked twice in an interview, responses are 
not always identical. Correlations are about +. 70. Over a period of a week, 
test-retest reliability drops to circa +. 60. Though responses seldom change 
from `happy' to `unhappy', switches from `very' to `fairly' are rather 
common. The difference between response-options is often ambiguous. The 
respondent's notion about his/her happiness tends to be global. Thus, the 
choice for one answer-category or the next is sometimes haphazard.  
Because choice is often arbitrary, subtle differences in interrogation can 
exert considerable effect. Variations in place where the interview is held, 
characteristics of the interviewer, sequence of questions and precise 
wording of the key-item can tip the scale to one response or the other. Such 
effects can occur in different phases of the response process; in the 
consideration of the answer as well as in the communication of it.  
Much of these biases are random, and balance out in large samples. 
Therefore, in large samples, random error does not affect the accuracy of 
happiness averages. Yet it does affect correlations, random error 'attenuates' 
correlations. Random error can be estimated by means of multipletrait-
multiplemethod (MTMM) studies, and correlations can be corrected 
(disattenuated) on that basis.  
Some biases may be systematic, especially bias produced by technique 
of interrogation and sequence of questions. Bias of that kind does affect the 
reliability of distributional data. In principle it does not affect correlations, 
unless the measure of the correlate is biased in the same way (correlated 
error). To some extend, systematic error can also be estimated and corrected.  
Comparability  
Another common qualm is that self-ratings of happiness cannot be 
meaningfully compared between persons and certainly not across cultures.  
Interpersonal Comparability 
It is commonly assumed that happiness is a matter of comparison of 
life-as-it-is with standards of how life-should-be and it is also assumed that 
these standards differ highly across individuals. Together, these 
assumptions imply that happiness is not comparable interpersonally; score 6 
on the above mentioned scale may mean something quite different for 
person A than for person B.  
If happiness is so idiosyncratic an appraisal indeed, it is unlikely to be 
correlated to hard differences in income, health and companionship. 
However, that prediction is not confirmed in empirical studies. In poor 
countries at least, income does matter to happiness. Happiness is also firmly 
related health, not only does good health add to happiness, but reversely, 
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happiness also sustains physical health and is even a strong predictor of 
long-term longevity (Danner et. al. 2001). Likewise, happiness is universally 
related to marriage and friendship (Diener 2000).  
The available data fit better with the theory that happiness depends on 
the gratification of inborn needs and in that context it is likely that the 
experience of enjoying one’s life has a very similar meaning for all humans, 
comparable to experiences of pain and hunger. I have discussed this matter 
in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven 1991, 1997). See also Ng (1997) on this 
issue.  
Comparability Across Nations 
Average happiness differs markedly across nations. In scheme 3, we 
will see that Russians score currently 5. 4 on a 0-10 scale, while in Canada 
the average is 7. 7. Does that mean that Russians really take less pleasure in 
life? Several claims to the contrary have been advanced. I have checked 
these doubts elsewhere (Ouweneel & Veenhoven, 1991, Veenhoven 1993b). 
The results of that inquiry are summarized below.  
Language: The first objection is that semantic differences hinder 
comparison. Words like `happiness' and `satisfaction' would not have the 
same connotations in different tongues. Questions using such terms would 
therefore measure slightly different matters. I checked that hypothesis by 
comparing the rankorder produced by three kinds of questions on life-
satisfaction: a question about `happiness', a question about `satisfaction with 
life' and a question that invites to a rating between `best- and worst possible 
life'. The rankorder appeared to be almost identical. I also compared 
responses on questions on happiness and satisfaction in two bi-lingual 
countries, and found no evidence for linguistic bias either.  
Desirability: A second objection is that responses are differentially 
distorted by desirability-bias. In countries where happiness ranks high in 
value, people would be more inclined to overstate their enjoyment of life. I 
inspected that claim by checking whether reported happiness is indeed 
higher in countries where hedonic values are most endorsed. This appeared 
not to be the case. As a second check, I inspected whether reports of general 
happiness deviate more from feelings in the past few weeks in these 
countries, the former measure being more vulnerable for desirability 
distortion than the latter. This appeared not to be the case either.  
Response styles: A third claim is that response-styles distort the answers 
dissimilarly in different countries. For instance, collectivist orientation 
would discourage `very' happy responses, because modest self-presentation 
is more appropriate within that cultural context. I tested this hypothesis by 
comparing happiness in countries differing in value-collectivism, but found 
no effect in the predicted direction. The hypothesis failed several other tests 
as well.  
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Western concept? A related claim is that happiness is a typical western 
concept, which is alien to people in non-western nations. Unfamiliarity 
would lead to lower scores. If so, we can expect more `don't know' and `no 
answer' responses in non-western nations. However, that appeared not to 
be the case6.  
Still another way to check the misgivings about cross-cultural 
comparability of happiness is to consider the correlation between average 
happiness in nations and characteristics of these nations. If conceptions of 
happiness are so different and responses so differently distorted, we will 
find little correlation with actual wealth, freedom and peace in the country. 
Yet comparative research has learned that about 75% of the observed 
differences in average happiness can be explained that way (Veenhoven 
1993, see also section 5. 3. 7). So the unique cultural variance is at best 25% 
and probably less.  
Measure of Gross National Happiness 
Gross National Happiness was defined as the degree to which citizens 
in a country enjoy their life-as-a-whole (cf. Section 2. 4) and next we have 
seen that individual happiness can be adequately measured by self-reports. 
Hence Gross National Happiness can be measured by the aggregation of 
individual happiness ratings as observed in surveys of the general 
population. Gross National Happiness can then be quantified by descriptive 
statistics of general tendency, such as the mean.  
Average Happiness in Nations 
This is in fact common practice and at this we know the average 
happiness in 67 nations in the 1990s. Some illustrative cases are presented 
below in scheme 3. The full list is on appendix 1.  
 
Scheme 3:Happiness in nations in the 1990s. Average self-reports on scale 0-10 
Source: World Database of Happiness 
                                                          
6 In Japan do we see a higher non-response indeed, though still below 5%. Still this not a general non-
western pattern. In India and Nigeria non-response is at the same level as in western nations.  
Top >7,7 Middle range ± 6,0 Bottom <4,0 
Switzerland 
 
8,1 Bolivia 6,2 Russia 4,2 
Denmark 8,0 Poland 6,2 Georgia 4,1 
Iceland 7,8 Bangladesh 6,0 Armenia 3,7 
Luxembourg 
 
7,8 Turkey 5,9 Ukraine 3,3 
Canada 
 
7,7 South-Africa 5,7 Moldavia 3,0 
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Happiness in Bhutan 
Happiness has not yet been assessed in Bhutan. Though a few surveys 
have been conducted in that country, none of these involved questions 
about happiness. This lack illustrates that the concept of Gross National 
Happiness has served to express an intention in the first place.  
For the time being, we can only speculate about the level of happiness 
in Bhutan. Yet the available data on other countries allow an educated 
guess. Comparative research has revealed strong links between average 
happiness in nations and several societal characteristics and on that basis I 
predict that current Bhutan will score in the lower middle range between 6 
and 5.  
I do not expect a high level of happiness in present day Bhutan because 
the material standard of life is still too low and the culture is collectivistic. 
Another reason for my expectation is that the country faces major social 
change. The dramatic fall of happiness in the post communist world 
illustrates that this may reduce happiness temporarily. On the other hand 
Bhutan scores well on quality of governance and the country is in peace. 
Possibly its distinct culture also has a positive effect on average happiness. 
So I do not expect that unhappiness prevails in the country.  
Combined Measure of 'Happy Life Years'  
The concept of Gross National Happiness can also be operationalized 
by combining the above-discussed measure of average happiness in the 
country with data about longevity. Together that provides an estimate of 
how long and happy people life in a country.  
Why Combine? 
This combination has two advantages: A pragmatic advantage that the 
duration of happiness is taken into account. Next a theoretical advantage is 
that this combination fits an evolutionary perspective on the good life.  
Taking Duration into Account 
One could imagine that people live happy in a country but not long, 
possibly as a result of too much indulgence. If so, many would opt for a less 
happy but longer life. This illustrates that we should not only consider the 
degree of happiness, but also its duration.  
A similar problem exists with the use of life-expectancy as a social 
indicator. If growing older means that we spend more years ailing, the rise 
of longevity does not mark real progress. That problem was solved by 
introducing the measures of 'Disability Adjusted Life Years', which count 
only the number of years spend in good health. Similarly we can compute 
'Happiness Adjusted Life Years'. In section 4. 2 I will show how.  
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Significance for Biological Adaptation 
Longevity is an indicator of successful adaptation for all creatures; any 
organism perishes if it fails to meet the demands of its environment. 
Survival is the only indicator of good adaptation for most species, but in 
higher animals successful adaptation also reflects in affective experience. 
The basic function of feelings is probably to inform the organism whether it 
is in the right pond or not. Since this faculty is only required in organisms 
that can move from one environment to another, it exists probably only in 
higher animals and not in plants (Morris 1992).  
Like other higher animals humans are also endowed with the faculty of 
affective experience. Research has shown that our affective reaction 
typically precedes cognitive appraisals (Zajonc 1980), which suggests that 
the development of reason in the human species did not replace the earlier 
affective orientation system but came to function next to that. There is also 
evidence that human judgements of their life-as-a-whole draw on affective 
information in the first place (Schwarz & Strack 1991) and that is another 
indication that this orientation system still works.  
In this view, happiness is another signal of good adaptation, which can 
be meaningfully combined with longevity. If people live long and happy in 
a society, that society is apparently successful in meeting the needs of the 
human species.  
This brings me to the wider point that the outcome of life in happy life 
years also indicates how well the living conditions in the country fit with 
the life-abilities of its citizens. That link is visualized in scheme 4 This 
scheme presents the same fourfold as in scheme 1, with addition of key 
words from biological adaptation theory. The added arrows signify that 
both happiness and longevity in the right bottom quadrants are the result of 
preconditions depicted in the two top-quadrants and in particular an 
outcome of the fit between demands of the environment and life-ability of 
the individual. Hence the realized number of happy life years in a country 
indicates the chances for a life and analysis of variation in HLY can 
therefore help to identify the conditions that are most crucial for human 
thriving.  
 
Scheme 5: Biological view on relations between qualities of life 
 Outer qualities 
 
Inner qualities 
Life chances Livability of 
environment 
(biotope) 
Life-ability of the person 
(Fitness) 
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 Life results Utility of life 
(ecological 
function) 
 
 
              Survival 
 Feeling 
 
How Combine? 
The number of years citizens live happily in a country can be measured 
by combining information about length of life drawn from civil registrations 
of birth and death with data on overall appreciation of life as assessed in 
surveys. The following simple formula can be applied:  
 
Happy-Life-Years = Life-expectancy at birth x 0-1 happiness 
 
Suppose that life expectancy in a country is 50 years, and that the 
average score on a 0 to 10-step happiness scale is 5. Converted to a 0-1 scale, 
the happiness score is than 0,5. The product of 50 and 0,5 is 25. So the 
number of happy life years is 25 in that country. If life expectancy is 80 years 
and average happiness 8, the number of happy life years is 64 (80 x 0,8).  
Theoretically, this indicator has a broad variation. The number of 
Happy Life Years is zero if nobody can live in the country at all, and will be 
endless if society is ideal and its inhabitants immortal. The practical range 
will be between about 20 and 75 years. Presently at least, life expectancy at 
birth in nations varies between 30 and 80, whereas average happiness is 
seldom lower than 0,4 on a 0 to 1 scale and seldom higher than 0,8. The 
number of happy-Life-Years will always be lower than standard life 
expectancy. It can equal real length of life only if everybody is perfectly 
happy in the country (score 1 on scale 0 to 1).  
High HLY means that citizens live both long and happily, low HLY 
implies that the life of the average citizen is short and miserable. Medium 
HLY values can mean three things: 1) both moderate length-of-life and 
moderate appreciation-of-life, 2) long but unhappy life, and 3) short but 
happy life.  
I have described this indicator in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven 
1996, 2000). It scored highest in a scholarly review of social indicators 
(Hagerty ea. 2001).  
Findings on Happy Life Years in Nations 
Happy Life Years can be compared across nations and over time. Such 
comparisons reveal striking differences and these differences can be linked 
to societal development. Below I present some illustrative findings.  
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Difference Across Nations 
Data on Happy-Life-Years in nations are published on the World 
Database of Happiness (WDH 2003). This continuous register of research on 
subjective enjoyment of life is updated regularly. Currently it provides data 
on 67 nations in the 1990s. These data are presented on appendix A. Scheme 
6 presents some illustrative cases.  
 
Scheme 6: Happy-Life-Years in nations in the 1990s 
Top > 58 years Middle range ± 41years Bottom <30 years 
Switzerland 63,0 Philippines 43,7 Georgia 29,7 
Iceland 61,8 Greece 41,4 Russia 27,8 
Denmark 59,9 Turkey 40,4 Armenia 26,2 
Sweden 59,9 Hungary 38,5 Ukraine 22,5 
Ireland 58,4 Bolivia 37,5 Moldavia 20,5 
 
We cannot compute HLY for Bhutan, since we do not yet know average 
happiness. If we assume that average happiness is about 5. 5 in Bhutan (cf. 
section 3. 3. 2) the number of happy life years would be about 347.  
Trend Over Time 
Time series are available for a few nations, for the USA since 1948, for 
Japan since 1958 and for the first member states of the European Union 
since 1973. All these nations witnessed a rise in the number of happy-life-
years. This is mainly because life expectancy augmented in all these nations, 
but in several cases HLY was also boosted by a rise in average happiness. 
The most spectacular case of that kind is Italy, where HLY rose 12 years 
since 1973.  
Scheme 7 presents the longest available time series, that of the USA 
1948-1998. Americans gained 7 Happy-Life-Years over these 50 years. Since 
average happiness remained at the same level over that period, this rise in 
HLY is entirely due to the rise in life expectancy. In this case, the 
proportional rise of HLY illustrates that this rise in length of did not go at 
the cost of lower quality of life. If the extra years added were spend in 
misery, HLY would have lagged or could even have declined.  
HLY went down in the former Soviet Union after the velvet revolution. 
Both happiness and life-expectancy plumped after 1990 and especially 
during the economic crisis in 1996. The latest data show a gradual recovery.  
Societal Ccorrelates of HLY 
The next question is of course whether there is a system in these 
differences and in particular whether the differences fit current conceptions 
of what a good society is like. To answer that question I inspected the 
                                                          
7 Life expectancy in Bhutan was 61. 5 in 1999 (Human Development Report 2001, pp. 143)  
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statistical relationship between HLY and five societal qualities that are cur-
rently on the political agenda. These qualities are: 1) material wealth, 2) 
freedom, 3) social equality, 4) brotherhood, and 5) justice. The indicators 
used for that purpose are enumerated in appendix B.  
 
 
 
Scheme 7: Happiness Adjusted Life Years in the USA 1948-1998 
United States
Time
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The analysis involves three steps: The first step is assessing how 
each of these societal characteristics relates to HLY. For that purpose I 
plotted scattergrams and computed zero-order correlations. Next I 
inspected to what degree the observed correlations could be attributed 
to differences in economic development across nations. For that purpose 
I computed partial correlations, controlling wealth of the country. Lastly 
I considered how much of the variance in HLY across nations could be 
explained by these societal characteristics together. An overview is 
presented in scheme 8. Below I will expand on the main findings.  
Wealth 
Until recently, quality-of-life in nations was in fact equated with 
material prosperity and measured by GDP per capita. It is now 
acknowledged that money is not everything, but wealth is still prominent in 
quality-of-life indexes such as the Human Development Index (UNPD 2001) 
and Estes' (1984) Index of Social Progress. How does this hallmark of 
'assumed' quality-of-life relate to our measure of 'apparent' quality-of-life?  
The relation between income per head and HLY in nations is 
presented in scheme 9. That scattergram shows a strong 
correspondence, the correlation coefficient is +. 73. This result fits the 
common assumption that wealth is essential to quality-of-life. Yet at a 
closer look one can see that there is a limit to the benefits of material 
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wealth. In the scattergram one can recognize the curve of diminishing 
returns. The correlation is mainly in the left segment of the scattergram 
among nations with an income per head below $ 15. 000. There is hardly 
any correlation among the richer nations (r = +. 18). 
 
 
Scheme 8: Societal Qualities and Happy-Life-Years in 67 nations in the 1990s 
 
Condition in nation Correlation with HLY 
 Zero-order Wealth  
Controlled 
N 
Wealth 
Purchasing power per head * +. 73 - 66 
Freedom 
Economic * +. 71 +. 38 64 
Political * +. 53 +. 13 63 
Personal  +. 61 +. 31 45 
Equality 
Disparity in incomes * -. 10 +. 37 62 
Discrimination of women -. 46 -. 12 51 
Disparity in happiness -. 64 -. 37 54 
Brotherhood 
Tolerance +. 72 +. 43 55 
Trust in compatriots +. 20 +. 20 37 
Voluntary work +. 40 +. 31 53 
Social security +. 34 -. 27 34  
Justice 
Rule of law * +. 65 +. 20 64 
Respect of civil rights * +. 60 +. 20 60 
Corruption -. 73 -. 32 40 
 
Explained variance by variables 
marked with *  
 
66% 
 
60 
 
Indicators described on appendix B 
Freedom 
Opinion about the blessings of freedom is mixed. Individualistic social 
philosophy assumes that people themselves know best what they need, and 
hence that they will thrive better if they can follow their own preferences. 
Conservatives doubt that people really know what is best for them and 
rather stress the wisdom of tradition and experts. Some schools of thought 
see different effects of different variants of freedom. Currently the New 
Right is quite positive about economic freedom, but at the same time it is 
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critical about freedom in the private sphere of life. Free sex and the 
legalization of soft drugs are seen to as a treat to the quality-of-life. Likewise 
a common view in South-East Asia is that economic freedom will improve 
the human lot but not political freedom.  
The relation between political freedom and HLY is presented in 
scheme 10. Again we see a positive correlation, but the shape of the relation 
is linear in this case, which suggests that freedom has not yet met its limit. 
Similar patterns appear in the relation of economic freedom and personal 
freedom with HLY. These findings support the liberal position. I have 
discussed this matter in more detail elsewhere (Veenhoven 1999, 2000b). 
Scheme 9: Wealth and Happy-Life-Years in 66 nations in the 1990s 
1995 Purchasing power p/c
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Free nations are typically also rich nations and hence the partial 
correlations in table 1 are considerably lower than the zero-order 
correlations. This could mean that the zero-order correlations are largely 
spurious and that wealth is the main determinant of HLY. Yet is it also 
possible that freedom and wealth affect HLY equally much or that freedom 
affects HLY through its effects on the growth of wealth. By lack of good 
time series we cannot disentangle these effects as yet. For the time being, the 
partial correlations mark a minimum.  
Equality 
There is also difference of opinion on the significance of social equality 
for the quality-of-life in nations. Egalitarians claim that social inequality is 
antithetical to quality-of-life, not only because it is morally unjust but also 
because of its detrimental effects on self-respect and social bonds. 
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Conservatives rather stress the positive functions of inequality and expect 
that enforced equality will go at the cost of quality-of-life. The discussion 
focuses very much on income-equality.  
The evidence in mixed in this case, since not all kinds of equality relate 
in the same way to HLY. Surprisingly there is no statistical association with 
income inequality. The scattergram on scheme 11 shows that people live 
equally long and happy in nations with small income disparities, such as 
Japan, as in nation with great income differences, such as Mexico. Statistical 
control for wealth of the nations suggests even a positive effect of income 
inequality. 
Scheme 10: Political freedom and Happy-Life-Years in 63 nations in the 
1990s 
political freedom
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 The correlation with inequality between males and females is more in 
line with egalitarian supposition; HLY being higher in nations were women 
are least discriminated. Yet the partial correlation is quite small, which 
could mean that gender equality works out less beneficial after all.  
HLY relates most strongly with difference in happiness as measured by 
its standard deviation and this correlation remains robust after control for 
wealth of the nation. Elsewhere I have argued that social inequality in 
nations cannot be measured inclusively by adding differences in access to 
different matters and the disparities in access to relevant resources (inputs) 
reflect best in the dispersion of happiness (output) (Veenhoven 2002). If I am 
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right in that, these correlations mean that inequality still matters, though 
apparently not the specific inequalities that figure most prominently on the 
political agenda these days.  
 
Scheme 11: Income Inequality and Happy-Life-Years in 62 nations in the 
1990s 
1990s Gini index: income inequlity
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Brotherhood 
Next to freedom and equality, ‘brotherhood’ figured in the slogan of 
the French revolution (Liberté, egalité, and fraternité) and social solidarity is 
still seen as a prerequisite for a good life. In this analysis I considered two 
aspects of brotherhood in nations, first interpersonal respect and 
cooperation and second ‘organized solidarity’ in collective systems of social 
insurance.  
The indicators of interpersonal relations relate positively to HLY. The 
strongest correlation is with ‘tolerance’ as measured by acceptance of 
minority group members as a neighbor. There is also a positive correlation 
with self-reported trust in compatriots and with activity in voluntary 
organizations. All these correlations are largely independent of wealth of 
the nation.  
The case of ‘organized solidarity’ is different however. The zero-order 
correlation between social security expenditures and HLY is positive, but 
control for wealth of the nation reveals a negative relationship. I have 
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investigated that matter in more detail elsewhere and found indeed that 
people are not happier and healthier in nations with lavish social security 
systems than in equally rich nations where Father State is less openhanded 
(Veenhoven 2000c). Apparently we can live equally well in a residual 
welfare state. This finding illustrates that ‘presumed’ qualities of life do not 
always match ‘apparent’ quality-of-life.  
Justice 
Righteousness is also commonly mentioned as prerequisite for a good 
life. In this analysis I consider three indicators of justice in nations: rule of 
law, respect of civil liberties and prevalence of corruption. The relation 
between corruption and HLY is depicted in figure 5.  
The scattergram reveals a strong negative relationship with this aspect 
of injustice. The other indicators of justice in nations are also strongly 
related to HLY. See scheme 12.  
The partial correlations are also positive, but much smaller. Like in the 
case of freedom this does not necessarily mean that the independent effect 
of justice is small, since the common variance of justice and wealth can be 
due to an effect of the former on the latter.  
Scheme 12: Corruption and Happy-Life-Years in 40 nations in the 1990s 
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Explained Variance 
As a last step I considered how well these societal inputs predict the 
output of years lived happily. I limited that analysis to the variables of 
which we have at least 60 cases. This left me with wealth, economic 
freedom, political freedom, income inequality, rule of law and civil rights. 
Together these six societal qualities explain 66% of the variance in HLY in 
nations. Consideration of more variables in smaller nation sets yields R2 
values of. 85 and more.  
 This implies that much of the things policy makers aim at do indeed 
matter for Gross National Happiness. Why then bother about measuring 
that matter? One reason is that not everything deemed required for a good 
life is really necessary. We saw this in the cases of income equality and 
social security. Secondly some of the things that are required today may 
loose relevance tomorrow. This is illustrated by the diminishing utility of 
wealth. Thirdly, HLY is more easily measured than current indexes of 
presumed quality-of-life and lastly the concept of Happy-Life-Years is also 
easier to understand.  
Conclusion 
The concept of Gross National Happiness can be operationalized as the 
degree to which citizens in a country live long and happily and can be 
quantified in the number of Happy Life Years (HLY) per capita.  
HLY differentiates well across nations and the pattern of differences 
makes sense. HLY differentiates also over time and can therefore serve to 
monitor long-term progress.  
This indicator pairs public appeal with theoretical relevance and has 
many advantages over current indices of social progress such as the Human 
Development Index.  
 
Appendix A: Apparent quality-of-life in 67 nations in the 1990s 
Nation 
Enjoyment of life1 
(scale 0 - 1) 
Length of life2 
(in years) 
Happy 
Life Years3 
 Argentina 6,8 72,6 49,1 
 Armenia 3,7 70,9 26,2 
 Australia 7,3 78,2 56,9 
 Austria 6,1 76,7 47,0 
 Azerbaijan 4,9 71,1 34,7 
 Bangladesh 6,0 56,9 34,2 
 Belarus 4,4 69,3 30,3 
 Belgium 7,3 76,9 56,4 
 Bolivia 6,2 60,5 37,5 
 Brazil  7,0 66,6 46,3 
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 Britain 7,2 76,8 55,4 
 Bulgaria 4,3 71,2 30,5 
 Canada  7,7 79,1 60,6 
 Chile  6,9 75,1 52,0 
 China  6,74 69,2 46,7 
Appendix A continued: 
Nation 
Enjoyment of life1 
(scale 0 - 1) 
Length of life2 
(in years) 
Happy 
Life Years3 
 Colombia 8,14 70,3 57,1 
 Costa Rica 7,94 76,6 60,8 
 Croatia 5,5 71,6 39,6 
 Czecho-
Slovakia 5,9 71. 7 42. 3 
 Denmark 8,0 75,3 59,9 
 Dominican 
Rep.  6,8 70,3 47,9 
 Ecuador 6,4 69,5 44,5 
 El Salvador 7,4 69,4 51,7 
 Estonia 5,0 69,2 34,6 
 Finland 7,5 76,4 57,1 
 France  6,4 78,7 50,5 
 Georgia 4,1 73,2 29,7 
 Germany 6,7 76,4 51,4 
 Ghana  7,74 57,0 43,9 
 Greece  5,3 77,9 41,4 
 Guatemala 7,2 66,1 47,3 
 Honduras 7,0 68,8 48,0 
 Hungary 5,6 68,9 38,6 
 Iceland 7,8 79,2 61,8 
 India  6,2 61,6 38,5 
 Ireland 7,6 76,4 58,4 
 Italy  7,0 78,0 54,6 
 Japan  6,3 79,9 50,0 
 Latvia  4,8 68,0 32,5 
 Lithuania 5,0 70,2 35,1 
 Luxembourg 7,8 76,1 59,2 
 Macedonia 5,2 71,9 37,6 
 Mexico  7,3 72,1 52,5 
 Moldavia 3,0 67,8 20,5 
 Netherlands 7,5 77,5 58,3 
 Nicaragua 7,6 67,5 51,2 
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 Nigeria 6,34 51,4 32,6 
 Norway  7,4 77,6 57,5 
 Panama  7,1 73,4 52,3 
 Paraguay 6,8 69,1 46,7 
 Peru 6,0 67,7 40,4 
Appendix A continued: 
Nation 
Enjoyment of life1 
(scale 0 - 1) 
Length of life2 
(in years) 
Happy 
Life Years3 
 Philippines 6,5 67,4 43,7 
 Poland  6,2 71,1 43,8 
 Portugal 6,7 74,8 50,5 
 Romania 5,4 69,6 37,7 
 Russia  4,2 65,5 27,8 
 South-Africa 5,7 64,1 36,7 
 South-Korea 6,3 71,7 45,3 
 Slovenia 6,0 73,2 43,8 
 Spain  6,5 77,7 50,8 
 Sweden  7,6 78,4 59,9 
 Switzerland 8,1 78,2 63,0 
 Turkey  5,9 68,5 40,4 
 Ukraine 3,3 68,5 22,5 
 Uruguay 6,7 72,7 49,0 
 USA  7,4 76,4 56,9 
 Venezuela 6,4 72,3 46,0 
 
Technical Details 
Average enjoyment of life assessed by means of surveys in general 
public samples. This list is based on responses to questions on life-
satisfaction.  
Most scores are based on responses to the following question: 
"All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life-
as-a-whole now? 1 dissatisfied …………………. 10 satisfied".  
Scores on this 1-10 scale were transformed linearly to range 0-10. This 
transformation in explained in the introductory text, chapter 7. 3.  
Scores of most Latin American nations are based on responses to a 
somewhat different question.  
"In general, would you say that you are satisfied with your life? Would 
you say that you are…very satisfied (4), quite satisfied (3), satisfied (2) or 
not very satisfied (1)?" 
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Scores on this 1-4 scale were transformed to range 0-10 by means of 
expert weighing of response options. This so-called 'Thurstone procedure' is 
explained in chapter 4/3 of the introductory text.  
Since the above 1-10 questions have also been used in five of these 
Latin American nations, I could check whether this transformation yields 
comparable results. The transformed scores appeared to be slightly higher 
and were therefore corrected by subtracting 0,5 point.  
This combination of scores on two slightly different questions results in 
a list of 67 cases. The number of cases is smaller if one restricts to responses 
on identical questions. Restriction to a common question on 'happiness' 
yields 60 cases and limitation to the above 1-10 life-satisfaction item 54 
cases.  
Life expectancy is estimated on the basis of civil registrations of birth 
and death. Source: Human Development Report 2001, table 1.  
Life-satisfaction scores may be inflated in some countries, due to under 
sampling of rural population or inexperience with anonymous interviewing. 
Dubious cases are China, Colombia, Ghana and Nigeria.  
 
Appendix B: Characteristics of nations, used in correlational analysis 
Wealth 
Income  Purchasing power per head in 1995 
Human Development Report 1999, table 1 
(UNDP) 
Freedom 
Economic Index of economic freedom 1999.  
Heritage Foundation 
Political Index of suppression of political rights 1994-95 
(reversed) 
Karantnycky et. al. 1995 
Personal Index of freedom in personal life. Involves 
absence of restrictions to traveling, religion, 
marriage, sex and suicide. Both legal 
restrictions and public acceptance  
Veenhoven 2000b 
Equality 
Income equality Gini index 
Human Development Report 2001 table 12 
(UNDP) 
Gender equality SIGE index of gender inequality.  
Dijkstra 2000 
Equality in 
happiness 
Standard deviation of life satisfaction.  
Veenhoven 2002 
Brotherhood 
Tolerance Responses to survey questions about the kind 
of people one would like to have as a neighbor.  
World Value Surveys 1990-1995, items 51-60 
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Trust in compatriots Responses to survey question 
World value Surveys 1990-1995, item 41 
Voluntary work Responses to survey questions 
World value Surveys 1990-1995, items 28-35 
Social security Expenditures in percent of GDP 
ILO 1995 
 
Appendix B continued: 
Justice 
Rule of law Index of Institutional Quality 1997-98 
IMF, World Economic Outlook October 
2000  
Violation of civil 
rights 
Index of suppression of civil rights 1994-
95 
Karantnycky et. al. 1995  
Corruption Rating by foreign businessmen and 
journalists 
Transparency International 
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